Experimental studies have shown different degrees of randomness both over time and across different setups. This paper proposes Thompson sampling as a way to explain this randomness endogenously. Thompson sampling means that individuals update their subjective probability distribution of unknown parameters in a Bayesian way, make a random draw from the posterior, and then act optimally, conditional on that draw. For different experimental datasets (2x2 games and forecasting in markets), the empirical fit of Thompson sampling is compared to two other hypotheses of noisy decision-making: Bayesian learning with exogenous shocks and quantal response equilibrium (QRE). In datasets where the amount of randomness does not vary, the difference between Thompson sampling and other models is insignificant. Conversely, in datasets where the amount of randomness varies substantially, Thompson sampling provides a better fit than the other two benchmarks.
Introduction
Numerous studies in economics find that individual choices can be considered as stochastic: when individuals are asked to make repeated choices from the same set of options, they are frequently observed to make different choices over time.
1 Randomness in choice has often been interpreted as driven by unobservable factors. (See e.g. Train (2009)) Even in an artificial laboratory setup, in which the experimenter has full information and control over observables, there is frequently a myriad of unobservables stemming for instance from cognitive factors. Due to the presence of those unobservables, an agent's choice cannot be predicted exactly and thus contains a random element.
Traditionally, randomness has been introduced into many areas of economics by exogenous shocks. Not only has this been common practice in macroeconomics and econometrics, but also in microeconomics, where exogenous shocks are used for example by random utility models (McFadden, 1974; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2006) and noisy generalizations of equilibrium such as quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995 ).
Yet, those exogenous shocks are arbitrary and thus cannot explain why noise patterns differ systematically across setups and time. Many experimental studies document that the amount of noise is greater in some environments than others (e.g. Hommes et al. (2005) , Fehr and Tyran (2008) , Heemeijer et al. (2009 ), Mauersberger (2016 ) and that the amount of noise observed varies over time (e.g. Nagel (1995) ). Applications of quantal response equilibrium to laboratory data have thus frequently demonstrated structural breaks over time in their exogenous parameters (see e.g. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) ) or have allowed their exogenous parameters to differ across different experiments (see e.g Dufwenberg et al. (2007) ). The fact that models like quantal response do not endogenously account for these changing noise patterns inhibits their use for predictive purposes. This paper thus introduces Thompson sampling (Thompson, 1933) as a different way of looking at stochastic decision-making in situations of strategic interaction in economics.
Consider penalty kicks in soccer as an illustrative example for decision-making. The player has to decide whether to kick the ball into the left-hand side or into the right-hand side of the goal, and the goalkeeper has to decide where jump. While there is a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of playing both left and right with 50 % probability, the actual probability with which the player plays left or right may in practice be less clear due to for example different player abilities. Thus, the goalkeeper has to gauge or estimate these probabilities. Assume the goalkeeper uses Bayesian inference. Then she first has some initial belief, called prior distribution. Suppose the goalkeeper has watched the specific player in many previous matches, then those observations are used to update the prior distribution using Bayes' rule. The resulting distribution is the posterior distribution. If the goalkeeper is an expected utility maximizer, she would always use a well-defined point of the posterior to make her decision: the expected value. For example, if the expected value of the player choosing left is 50.1 %, the goalkeeper would always jump to the left.
If she nevertheless jumped to the right, it would represent an exogenous shock in the sense that the classical expected utility model could not explain that.
Thompson sampling departs from the view that the decision-maker always uses the expected value. Instead, it postulates that the decision-maker makes a random draw from the posterior.
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Conditional on that draw, the agent acts optimally. If the goalkeeper in the penalty example is a Thompson sampler, she might end up drawing a 60 % probability of the player choosing left, which would urge her to jump to the left; alternatively, she could draw a 45 % probability of the player choosing left from the posterior, which would urge her to jump to the right.
This has two important implications for randomness. First, shocks are endogenous in the sense that the distribution from which the element is drawn changes over time due to Bayesian learning.
3 Second, randomness is introduced into belief formation rather into the selection of an action.
Thompson sampling has been widely used in psychology and computer science, 4 but has, to the best of my knowledge, not previously been used in economics. I show that Thompson sampling is widely applicable over many setups in economics, not only comprising simple microeconomic games on the discrete action space but also setups in macroeconomics. Hence, Thompson sampling could be considered a unifying approach to the literature of learning and out-of-equilibrium decision-making, which has been quite disconnected across the two subfields in economics, microeconomics and macroeconomics.
This paper investigates to what extent Thompson sampling has descriptive power in different setups of interactive decision-making. As benchmarks for comparison, I use two models of noisy decision-making: quantal response equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) and Bayesian learning with exogenous shocks from a type I extreme value distribution, so that actions are chosen with the probabilities of a logit model.
I apply those three models to laboratory data, because they represent controlled environments in which most confounding factors that could drive randomness are eliminated and the cognitivelydriven randomness purported by Thompson sampling can be observed. 5 Second, the information given to subjects is controlled so that there is little ambiguity of which observations the subjects use to update their beliefs.
The datasets used in this paper represent very different setups: The first dataset is taken from Erev et al. (2007) and contains multiple rounds of ten different 2x2 games with perfect and complete information. The ten games are distinct by different payoff matrices and observed randomness in play is greater in some games than in others. The second dataset contains learningto-forecast experiments by Heemeijer et al. (2009) , in which agents are asked to forecast prices in two different markets: one in which forecasting decisions are strategic substitutes and one in which forecasting decisions are strategic complements. In the market with strategic substitutes, dynamics quickly converge to the fundamental and noise tends to fade, while in the market with strategic complements, dynamics do not converge to the equilibrium and display persistent fluctuations.
Thompson sampling is particularly successful in endogenously predicting different dynamics across environments such as the differences between strategic substitutes and complements in the learning-to-forecast experiments. In settings such as the 2x2 games, where differences in behavior caused by unobservable factors are less distinct, there is no evidence that Thompson sampling provides a better fit than other models.
5 Data from soccer penalty kicks have been used before in the economics literature (see e.g. Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) ). Yet, they have the limitation that they do not contain long time series, as they only contain few observations of every goalkeeper-player pair.
Pure belief learning models assume that players would choose a i t by computing the expected value of u i t (assuming that it exists) over the entire space of θ i :
Since the expected value is a fixed point for any history of signals ζ i t , this results in a theory of deterministic play.
Thompson sampling departs from that approach and introduces a theory of stochastic beliefs.
Similarly to the bandit literature, as θ i is unknown, the individual has a dual objective: acquiring new information (exploration) and payoff maximization (exploitation.) Thompson sampling belongs to a class of heuristics referred to as probability matching, in which the decision-maker randomly selects an actionã i according to its probability of maximizing the payoff conditional on her beliefs:
This probability must be computed or estimated due to the unknown parameter θ i .
Within that class of heuristics, Thompson sampling is the specific case, in which θ i is updated in a Bayesian way. Hence, the probability of a specific actionã i being optimal to play in period t depends on the posterior of the parameter θ i given the history of actions and payoffs until period t-1:
where I is the indicator function, being 1 if the expression in square brackets is true and 0 otherwise.
However, (7) does not have to be computed explicitly. The objective in (6) is attained by making a random drawθ i t from its probability distribution µ i (θ i |ζ i t ) and acting optimally conditional on this draw.
In summary, the Thompson sampling algorithm works in the following way:
In each period t = 1, ..., T , every player i proceeds the following way
2. Choose a i and suppose, without loss of generality, there is an action set A i = {a i1 , ..., a iJ i }, where J i is the number of pure strategies.
Then, a multinomial logit specification is given by:
This specification, being often referred to as softmax learning, is widely used in the learning literature. Redefining λ ≡ 1 σ yields an exogenous parameter, governing the rationality of agents.
If σ → ∞ or λ = 0, agents can be considered completely irrational, since they would choose each action with equal probability. Conversely, as σ = 0 or λ → ∞ players become completely rational.
Since λ is exogenous, the amount of randomness in these logit-type models is by design also exogenous. This is a stark assumption, which is also at odds with many experimental studies (see introduction). While applications of the logit quantal response equilibrium allow for different 7 An alternative specification in the previous learning literature is a power probability specification of which the linear Luce specification used in early reinforcement learning literature is a special case. For a discussion of the relative merits and drawbacks of the power and the logit specifications, see Camerer and Ho (1999) . Less common is a multinomial probit specification due to computational difficulties. (See Cameron and Triverdi (2005) for a discussion.) λ-parameters over settings (Dufwenberg et al., 2007) and over time (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) , the exogeneity of this parameter impedes the use of those models for predictive purposes.
Instead of focusing on the random part i t , the previous learning literature has focused on the specification of the deterministic part of the random utility function V (a i t =ã i ). Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995 ) is a specific hypothesis, purporting that this part is calculated rationally in the sense that V (.) is the expected value of the payoff, given equilibrium beliefs about other players' actions. Other approaches, including reinforcement learning (Roth and Erev, 1998) , heuristic-switching (Brock and Hommes, 1997) and experienced-weighted attraction learning (Camerer and Ho, 1999) , assume a boundedly rational way of calculating V (.), not using the assumption of equilibrium beliefs. beliefs does not occur other than due to deterministic (and optimal) responses to exogenous randomness in fundamentals. As stressed previously by Roth and Erev (1998) , pure belief learning models like fictitious play (first row center) correspond to Bayesian updating with deterministic action selection. Another example in this class of models is the "internal rationality" approach by Adam and Marcet (2011) . Bayesian learning can be augmented by introducing an exogenous random component determining agents' choice (second row center). Other models postulate nonBayesian learning hypotheses (second row right) and commonly add exogenous trembles to create probabilistic choice. Examples include reinforcement learning (Roth and Erev, 1998) , experienceweighted attraction (Camerer and Ho, 1999) and heuristic-switching models (Brock and Hommes, 1997 (Costain and Nakov, 2015) , and uses a non-arbitrary belief structure by assuming consistent beliefs. Thompson sampling has the advantage that it is easier to implement, as QRE requires an (often intractable) fixed point calculation. Koop and Poirier (1993) .) To disentangle whether any difference between Thompson sampling and QRE comes from the way beliefs are specified or from the error structure, I also provide a step in between with Bayesian learning in the same way as specified for Thompson sampling and a logit error structure, labeled as "Logit" (second row center). The approach labeled as "logit" can be considered to be a hybrid between Thompson sampling and QRE, since it uses the logistic error structure of QRE but an estimate for the expected payoff using the same belief specification as in Thompson sampling. Below I briefly review quantal response equilibrium for the unfamiliar reader and provide an exposition for the Bayesian logit approach.
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) assume that the deterministic part of the random utility function is the expected payoff. Calculation of the expected payoff requires specifying subjective beliefs of every player about the distribution of other players' actions a =i t . McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) assume that these subjective beliefs are consistent with the actual probability distribution of other players under the quantal response equilibrium hypothesis. Hence, the expected payoff is only conditioned on a player's own action and the probability distribution of others P r(a
Assuming a type I extreme value distribution, the probability distributions over the actions are
given by the logit model:
Bayesian logit While quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is an equilibrium concept in which subjective beliefs coincide with objective beliefs, this assumption can be relaxed in favor of nonequilibrium beliefs about other players' probability of play µ i (a =i t ) or a perceived law of motion (PLM) about how the (market) outcomes are generated that may not coincide with the actual law of motion (ALM). 10 Those non-equilibrium beliefs µ i (a =i t ) may contain states that are unknown to the decision-maker and which she has to learn. It is assumed that as new information is available, the decision-maker updates µ i (a =i t ) in a Bayesian way. Given her Bayesian beliefs, she calculates the expected reward
If one assumes a type I extreme value distribution similarly to the application of quantal response equilibrium above, the probability distribution over the action space is given by the logit model:
3 Application to 2x2 games
Theory
There are n = 2 players, row (ROW) and column (COL). The set of actions for both players is
The game is repeated τ rounds, indexed by t = 1, 2, ...τ. The probability distributions of play 
11 As it is relevant for the subsequent applications, the payoffs could also represent lotteries: for example, if both players play L, ROW receives a fixed payoff υ with probability P R 1 , while COL does with probability P Belief formation about the other player's action Player i does not know the likelihood of her opponent's play p * (a 
, corresponding to the probability that player -i plays a −i,1 . Note that subjective beliefs about probabilities of the opponent's play are distinct from objective probabilities of the opponent's play by a missing t-subscript, which means that players do not take into account that other players learn over time.
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Player i has to form beliefs
. While beliefs can in principle be specified as an arbitrary probability distribution, I assume that
corresponds to a beta distribution:
where α A beta distribution is chosen for several reasons: first, it is the conjugate prior of the Bernouilli distribution, meaning that under a Bernouilli distributed outcome the posterior distribution is of the same family as the prior distribution. Second, the beta distribution is truncated to the unit interval so that it seems a natural choice for the distribution of a probability value.
12 Possible reasons may be cognitive costs or overconfidence, meaning that the player assumes that she is more sophisticated than her opponent. (See e.g. Camerer et al. (2004).) Choosing an action A rational learner would simply use the mean from the posterior distribution as an estimate for p −i (a −i,1 ) so that
This has been known as fictitious play (Brown, 1951) in the literature and would result in a deterministic choice conditional on the history of data. However, under Thompson sampling agents make a random draw from the posterior. The posterior conditional on the history up to period t-1 is given by (14), from which the agent makes a random draw denoted byp
Once agents made this draw, the choice of the player can be determined as being the optimal one conditional onp
The player uses her estimate of the probability that the other player plays a −i,1 ,p (L) as her estimate for the column player to play L, the row player's discounted expected payoffs are, for instance, if she plays L:
Hence, it is easy to see that the row player plays L if E(u
The probability that the row player's choice
where I p is the "regularized incomplete beta function", the c.d.f. of the beta function.
Belief updating After both players have made their choices, those choices are observed by the other player -i. Hence, every player i uses these observations to update her old beliefs
Belief updating is assumed to be purely Bayesian as in Thompson's (1933) proposal.
A specific property of the beta distribution is that Bayesian updating implies adding 1 to α
if she observes the opponent playing a −i,1 at the end of period t-1 and adding 1 to β
observes the opponent playing a −i,2 at the end of period t-1. Hence:
The beta distribution B(α
3.2 Empirical evaluation 3.2.1 Dataset 10 constant-sum games from Erev et al. (2007) are taken (payoffs shown in table 3), in which each subject played 500 periods of a 2x2 game against the same opponent. The numbers in each cell represent the probabilities that players win a fixed lottery prize υ, set to $0.04, on each trial. For instance, if ROW plays T and COL plays L, player 1 will win υ with the specified probability
, while player 2 will win υ with probability P COL 1
. Such a design has the advantage to control for risk preferences (see e.g. Roth and Malouf (1979) .) Each player knew the probabilities in the payoff matrix in the game she played. She was also informed about the action the other player has chosen and therefore of the probability with which her opponent won the lottery prize. The player also knew whether or not she herself received the lottery. However, players were not informed whether the opponent received the lottery prize or not.
The dynamic patterns of four of those games are shown in figure 1. It is of particular interest whether the noise patterns are similar across those ten games. Sign tests do not reject the hypothesis that the variance in the first 75 % of the rounds is the same as in the last 25 % of the rounds for nine out of ten games. The exception is game 1, displaying weak evidence of declining variance for the row player (p-value: 0.0898) and stronger evidence for the column player (p-value:
0.0195).
Different degrees of volatility across games are expected due to different Nash equilibria. For example, if the Nash equilibrium is 50-50, then equilibrium play, involving play of both strategies Table 3 : Games in Erev et al. (2007) with equal frequencies, has a greater variance than for a Nash equilibrium 80-20, where one strategy is played much more often than the other.
Methodology
The initial conditions (or priors) are estimated together with the rationality parameter λ. The initial priors are assumed to be the same within every type of player to save degrees of freedom.
Moreover, the parameters are assumed to be stationary over time, which can be considered reasonable, as the environment to which the subjects are exposed in the dataset is stationary over time by design of the experimenter (apart from other agents' behavior, which is endogenous in the behavioral models I consider.)
One could estimate the parameters using the entire sample. However, numerous studies have
shown that in-sample predictive ability does not necessarily imply out-of-sample predictive ability (Welch and Goyal, 2008; Stock and Watson, 2003 ) also because there is the peril of overfitting (see e.g. Leamer (1978) ), meaning that the parameter estimates are driven by noise in the calibration dataset. Thus, the ultimate test of a model is out-of-sample fitting, which is a common methodology both in microeconomics (e.g. Camerer and Ho (1999) ) and macroeconomics (see Clark and McCracken (2013)). 
Row player
Column player Nash eq. row Nash eq. column Figure 1 : Constant-sum one-stage 2x2 games with complete information played over 500 rounds from Erev et al. (2007) To hedge against overfitting, a cross-validation procedure is adopted. This means that the sample is divided into two parts: one part is the training sample, being used to estimate the model parameters. Those estimates are then used to predict the datapoints of the second part of the sample, the validation sample. Cross-validation is a powerful tool, because several partitions can be used and the results of several validation usually make conclusions about model evaluation more robust.
I use the log-likelihood (LL) as a loss function:
where n v denotes the number of subjects in the validation sample. The likelihood is an appropriate measure, since the models provide density forecasts due to their stochastic nature. Density forecasts give forecasts of all values that the variable of interest can take with a likelihood measure.
There are two empirical approaches to learning: first, there are individual learning models focusing on individual behavior in the learning process. The likelihood as in (20) 
The log-likelihood specification in (20) is a special case of (21), applying equal weight w(a 
where σ is the standard deviation of a A further question is whether a generalization criterion (see Busemeyer and Wang (2000) )
should be used so that the learning parameters are not only stable over time but also stable over games. If the learning parameters differed a lot across games, the natural question that would arise would be: what drives this difference in the learning parameters? Thus, it would be desirable to obtain estimates that are stable over setups so that one could predict the behavior in games a priori before collecting data. The conjecture that the learning parameters should be stable over environments provides a motivation for using the 10 different games as 10 partitions of the sample so that 10-fold cross-validation is used. This means that the exogenous parameters are estimated nine times, always leaving out one of the games. The game left out is then used for pseudo out-of-sample prediction.
QRE Applying QRE is straightforward. The logit equations constitute two equations with two unknown probabilities for every λ. Solving for these probabilities can be included in any search algorithm, finding the λ-parameter, which maximizes the log-likelihood of the training sample.
TS Since the payoff matrices are asymmetric, the priors for TS are allowed to differ for ROW and COL. However, following e.g. Camerer and Ho (1999) , the priors were restricted to be the same across all players. Thus, Thompson sampling has four free parameters corresponding to the priors α
. The data display stark differences in initial play, which can plausibly attributed to different information given to the subjects before the start of the game (e.g. payoff matrices). It would thus be incorrect to use the initial conditions of one game to predict the dynamics of another game. Hence, in a first step the initial priors have been estimated independently for every game with the objective to find a theory how initial play is determined.
The relative frequencies
have been found to be close to the Nash equilibria of every game.
Hence, the restrictions α
where p −i, * denotes the equilibrium play of L or T depending on the opponent and N the size of the "hypothetical" sample that players have in mind before playing.
Logit As the logit approach uses the same error structure as QRE (with one exogenous parameter) but the Bernouilli specification of TS (four exogenous parameters), the logit approach has five free parameters: the priors α
as in Thompson sampling as well as the λ-parameter. When independently estimated over games, the initial priors have also been found to be reasonably close to the Nash equilibria. Therefore and for the sake of comparability, the same restrictions as for Thompson sampling have been applied for logit. This gives two exogenous parameters to estimate: λ and the "hypothetical" sample size N. Figure 2 shows that all three models do better than random decision-making (choosing each action with a 50 % probability) in nine out of ten games. Signed-rank tests reject the hypothesis that random predicts observed behavior equally well as all three models examined. Random does better than Nash equilibrium in six out of ten games. Hence, there is no evidence that Nash equilibrium predicts behavior better than random. Yet, only QRE does significantly better than Nash equilibrium, while for the other two models there is no clear evidence that they outperform Nash equilibrium. For individual behavior, QRE also provides the better empirical fit than Logit and QRE.
Estimation results

TS
Tie (0.6455) Tie (0.5755) Tie (0.8808) Nash (0.0164) - The observations for individual behavior are altogether robust for average behavior as indicated by table 5. The only exceptions are that QRE does not do significantly better than Nash equilibrium and TS. Since there are no economically significant differences in the randomness observed in those games, these results are not surprising.
Parameters Table 6 reports the results. For the Bayesian logit, the initial sample takes rather low values, being about 4 on average.
The difference to TS can be explained by the fact that the Bayesian logit allows large shocks in the action space, while TS only allows for shocks in the beliefs. 
Application to expectation formation
Experiments have shown that, even in the presence of a unique equilibrium, learning dynamics on a continuous strategy space depend on the kind of feedback in the underlying system (Camerer and Fehr, 2006; Hommes, 2013 A challenge in the literature was to find a model that endogenously predicts these dynamics. Anufriev and Hommes (2012) propose a heterogeneous-agent model where agents endogenously choose between different forecasting rules, and according to Hommes (2013) , a homogeneous forecasting rule that endogenously predicts these dynamics is yet to be found. Thompson 
Dataset
I take the dataset of Heemeijer et al. (2009) . The setup is a learning-to-forecast game in the spirit of Marimon and Sunder (1994) , where subjects are only paid for their forecasting performance but market outcomes are determined by the computer. n = 6 participants are asked to form beliefs about the realization of a market price for 50 periods. After the six participants have typed their beliefs for the price in period t into the computer interface, the mean over the individual beliefs p e,i t (corresponding to the actions) for the price realization in period t are inserted into a price adjustment equation: ) represents a stochastic shock. Equation (23) (including the shock realizations t ) is never disclosed to the participants. Heemeijer et al. (2009) calibrate the parameters c, b different in their two treatments: in the treatment with strategic complements, the parameters are set to c = 
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It can easily be verified that this implies a unique fundamental p f = 60 as well as a unique rational expectations equilibrium.
Participants are rewarded according to a quadratic distance equation:
The results 
Theory
Suppose agents do not know the price adjustment equation (23). Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), I assume that they nevertheless perceive the law of motion of the prices to follow the same functional form as under rational expectations. However, consistently with the information structure in the experiment, they do not know the parameters. This means that players perceive that the prices p t are drawn from a normal distribution with a fixed mean p * so that the perception for player i of the form:
p * is unknown and corresponds to the variable or state θ * ,i (∀i ∈ I) that needs to be learned. For technical simplicity, I assume that the variance σ 2 is known (or the player believes to know the variance). Yet, I allow for the possibility that the variance σ 2 is not necessarily the same as the variance of the exogenous shocks, as players may anticipate the shocks that are introduced by the behavior of other players. Hence, one can think of a shock ν t , being different from the -shock, so
Consider a period t where each player i needs to forecast p t given past data until period t-1.
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Given (25), the optimal forecast is E t p t = p * . However, the challenge is that p * is unknown. The price realizations p t are observed by the player and thus constitute "signals" or "measurements" of p * .
Since p * is unknown, it can be considered as stochastic. The player has to form an initial, prior belief about it. In principle, this prior could take any form. However, for technical simplicity, it is assumed to be Gaussian:
where p * t denotes the candidate value for p * at time t. An optimizing Bayesian agent would forecast
However, an agent using Thompson sampling proceeds through the steps 1-4 in the previous section. To instantiate her belief about p * , she makes a random drawp * t from (26).
Conditionally onp * t , she chooses p e,i t as to maximize her expected reward. Using equation (24), the expected reward is given by:
which implies an optimal action of p e,i t =p * t . Once every individual has made her choice, the average price forecast in period 1, p
t , can be obtained and p t can calculated and announced to the players.
With p t , the distribution in equation (26) can be updated in a Bayesian way to obtain p * t+1 ∼ N (p * t+1 , ρ t+1 ). The Bayesian update is given by the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960) . The Kalman filter uses a filtering equation of the form:
Bayesian learning optimally determines g t using the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960) , which minimizes the expected loss between the price to be forecast, p t+2 , and the posterior mean,p * t+1 :
The variance ofp * t+1 , denoted by ρ t+1 , is obtained as
To initiate the individual belief for period t + 1, the distribution p * t+1 ∼ N (p * t+1 , ρ t+1 ) is used and the same steps are repeated in further periods.
To uniquely determine the distributions that generate the individual beliefs, the prior mean p * 0 , the prior variance ρ 0 and the variance of the perceived shock, σ 2 , need to be calibrated. 
Methodology
The methodology to empirically evaluate Thompson sampling relative to other approaches of endogenous noise is similar to the one used for 2x2 games. A cross-validation strategy is employed, in which the data is divided into k independent subsamples, of which k-1 are used as a training sample to estimate the parameters and one subsample is used for validation. I use every indepen-dent experimental group as one subsample. Having identified one group as an outlier that would distort the estimation, this gives k=12 subsamples. Since a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the hypothesis that first-period play follows the same distribution (p-value: 0.538) for both treatments, one can plausibly assume that initial play is independent of the treatment.
To compute the likelihood of QRE and Logit on the continuous strategy space numerically, a discrete approximation to the continuous functions has been provided, i.e. the space has been divided up into bins so that each bin can be mapped to an action and thus a probability of this bin being chosen. 16 I divide the space up into 100 equal intervals: 99, 100] . The specifics of how each model is applied in every case are exemplified in the following subsections.
QRE To the best of my knowledge, this is the first application of QRE to a learning-to-forecast design.
18 A preliminary question is whether λ is stable over time. In a multinomial logit regression on time dummies, using a categorical variable containing each unit from 0-100 as the dependent variable, this hypothesis could not be rejected. To make the calculation simpler, I assume the midpoint of each interval is used for payoff consideration, which is p e,ij − 0.5 for p e,ij = 1, 2, 3, ...., 100.
With the payoff function given in (2), the expected payoff is
where the last term comes from the exogenous disturbance t ∼ N (0, 0.25). For every λ, a fixed point is defined for the probability distribution P r(p e,i t = p e,ij ). 20 This fixed point is obtained through value function iteration. Since (31) contains the average action p ej and the convolution (distribution of the sum of random variables) of a logit rule does not have a closed-form solution, the probability distribution of the average was simulated in every iteration of the search algorithm 16 This requires caution, since a discretized space implies a probability mass function for QRE and Logit instead of a density function. However, if the bins are chosen to be of equal size, the probability of each strategy corresponds to its density so that P r(a i t ) = f (a i t ). Since under the division of bins used here, QRE, Logit and TS all create densities, their log-likelihoods are comparable.
17 Less than 1 % of all price forecasts are greater than 100. 18 QRE has previously been applied to the p-beauty contest game by Breitmoser (2012) , who uses a similar methodology to this paper.
19 Following other examples in the experimental literature such as Anufriev and Hommes (2012) , I assume that subjects consider the payoffs without the truncation at zero for the sake of analytical tractability.
20 For the treatments with the robot traders, p ej takes into account the choices of these computerized traders. Taking into account n t explicitly would require solving the fixed point problem for a wide range of values for p t−1 and thus makes the computational problem disproportionately more burdensome.
by making 6 draws from the estimate of the probability distribution in the current iteration of the algorithm, calculating the mean and repeating that procedure 2,000 times. The obtained frequencies for the mean can then be used as a good approximation of the distribution of the mean choice. The approximated distribution was then inserted into the right-hand side of the logit rule to calculate the individual probabilities. The algorithm would stop once this resulting probability is consistent with the probability used for simulating the distribution. The λ that maximizes the log-likelihood was yielded by embedding the fixed-point problem into a derivativefree simplex search algorithm. (Nelder and Mead, 1965) TS As exemplified in section 4, there are three prior parameters that need to be calibrated for the purpose of Bayesian updating:p * 0 , ρ 0 , σ 2 .
Logit Agents have the same Gaussian perception as in Thompson sampling:
with ν t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). This perception (or belief structure) is used for the calculation of the expected payoff for a particular forecast p e,i , V (.) = E(u i t |p t = p * + ν t , p e,i t = p e,i ), in the logit expression, where the payoff is given by equation (24).
Proposition 3. The expected payoff for a particular forecast p e,i conditional on the random walk perception in (32) is given by
wherep * t denotes the expectation of p * and ρ t the posterior variance using information up to period t-1.
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Proof. See Appendix 6.1.
This expected payoff is inserted into the logit equation. The integral of exp(λE t (u
e,i t = p e,i )) has been evaluated by a discrete approximation, dividing the strategy space from 0 to 100 up into equal bins. 22 Altogether, three parameters need to be estimated for the 21 The max(.) is ignored here for analytical tractability. 22 The midpoint of every interval has been used for expected payoff calculation.
Bayesian logit: the two initial priors from Thompson sampling,p * 0 , ρ 0 , the perceived noise variance σ 2 , as well as the rationality parameter λ from the logit distribution. Although the empirical fit of Thompson sampling and the Bayesian logit is very similar, the fact that Thompson sampling is slightly better in 11 out of 12 groups renders it the preferred model by the signed-rank test.
23 Note that ρ t , σ 2 do not only appear as constants in the expected payoff but also in the Kalman gain so that they determinep * t .
Both the Bayesian logit and Thompson sampling predict significantly better than QRE. Since the characteristic feature of QRE is equilibrium beliefs, this finding can be interpreted as evidence against equilibrium beliefs. 
Endogenous noise variance
As shown by equation 30, the series of posterior variances is deterministically pinned down. As
Thompson sampling introduces randomness through sampling from the posterior, there is by design no differences in randomness across environments. Predictions of the dynamics across environments are, however, particularly useful, since they may allow an ex-ante assessment of policies before they are implemented. For example, if a policy can be assessed as undesirable exante, one could both save potential implementation costs and prevent its negative effects. I show that Thompson sampling can be used as a model to make predictions across environments. For the current application, this requires relaxing the assumption that agents know the noise variance σ 2 .
I assume that agents update the noise variance as new observations become available, using the most recent estimate of the mean:
where σ Model comparison Figure 8 and 9 show the likelihood estimates for individual and average behavior respectively, while tables 7 and 11 show the results of pairwise Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
Observation 8. The empirical fit of TS for individual behavior is at least as good as or better than the Bayesian logit for most groups, but substantially worse in group 3 in the strategic substitute treatment.
While overall the difference in empirical fit between TS and the Bayesian logit is insignificant for strategic substitutes, TS predicts strikingly worse for group 3. This is however driven by only few datapoints and can be explained by outliers. Figure 4 reveals that large shocks from otherwise stable dynamics particularly occur in group 3.
Observation 9. For average behavior, the empirical fit of TS is better than the ones of the two benchmarks.
As shown in figure 9 , if less weight is attached to outliers, Thompson Table 12 : Parameters: Learning-to-forecast with endogenous variance Parameters As shown in table 12, the estimates for the rationality parameter λ are similar to the standard Kalman filtering case. Likewise, the value for the prior mean for the logit approach is robust.
Observation 10. The prior variances for both the logit approach and Thompson sampling are higher than in the standard case.
In the logit approach, the noise variance affects mainly the adjustment speed through the Kalman gain, since the spread of the actions is given by the logit distribution. The fact that both ρ 0 and σ 2 0 attain their maximum possible values is a sign that experience acquired during the game plays less of a role, since high values of the prior variances mitigate the effect of the experience obtained during the game.
For Thompson sampling, the prior noise variance σ 2 0 also attains its maximum. Since for Thompson sampling, σ 2 0 has a direct effect on dispersion in the action space, this can easily be explained by the fact that the variance of individual forecasts remains larger than the variance of the observed outcomes p t . However, the small prior sample size ψ = 4 allows for learning about the variance during the game.
Discussion
This paper has introduced Thompson sampling, a mechanism that has previously mainly been applied to the bandit problem, as a tractable theory of endogenous randomness into interactive games in economics. By applying Thompson sampling to 2x2 games and learning-to-forecast experiments, it has been shown that Thompson 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Ignoring the max(.), the score of the learning to forecast experiment for period t, using (24) 
where the last line uses the fact that V ar(µ) = E(µ 2 ) − (E(µ)) 2 .
